Search and endogenous growth: when Romer meets Lagos and Wright by Chu, Angus C. et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Search and endogenous growth: when
Romer meets Lagos and Wright
Angus C. Chu and Ching-Chong Lai and Chih-Hsing Liao
Durham University, Academia Sinica, National Chengchi University
February 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36691/
MPRA Paper No. 36691, posted 20. February 2012 01:38 UTC
Search and Endogenous Growth: When Romer Meets
Lagos and Wright
Angus C. Chu, Durham University Ching-Chong Lai, Academic Sinica
Chih-Hsing Liao, National Chengchi University
February 2012
Abstract
In this note, we develop a search-based monetary growth model to analyze the
growth and welfare e¤ects of ination. We introduce endogenous growth via capital
externality into a two-sector search model and compare the e¤ects of ination to those
from a standard cash-in-advance (CIA) growth model. We nd two important di¤er-
ences between the two approaches. First, while the growth e¤ect of ination operates
solely through endogenous labor supply in the CIA model, the growth e¤ect of ina-
tion operates through an additional consumption e¤ect in the decentralized market in
the search model. Second, we quantitatively evaluate the welfare cost of ination and
nd that the search model exhibits a larger (smaller) welfare gain than the CIA model
when we decrease the growth rate of money supply to achieve the Friedman rule (zero
ination). These contrasting results are due to a non-linearity in welfare as a function
of ination in the search model.
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1 Introduction
In this note, we analyze the e¤ects of ination and monetary policy on economic growth
and social welfare. Although this important issue in monetary economics has received much
attention and careful analysis in previous studies, our analysis provides some novel elements
and results. To highlight the novelty of this study, it is helpful to rst discuss two related
branches of literature in monetary economics. First, this study relates to the search-based
literature on money and capital formation; see for example, Shi (1999), Menner (2006),
Williamson and Wright (2010), Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011). This branch of lit-
erature analyzes the relationship between money and capital formation in a search-theoretic
framework without considering economic growth as an endogenous process. Second, this
study also relates to the branch of literature on ination and economic growth; see for ex-
ample, Wang and Yip (1992), Gomme (1993), Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Mino (1997) and
more recently, Itaya and Mino (2003, 2007). This branch of literature analyzes the growth
and welfare e¤ects of ination by modeling money demand based on the classical approach,
such as a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint, money in utility and transaction costs, without
considering search. In this study, we attempt to provide a bridge between these two branches
of literature by analyzing the growth and welfare e¤ects of ination in a search-based mone-
tary growth model. In summary, we introduce endogenous growth via capital externality as
in Romer (1986) into a two-sector search model based on Lagos and Wright (2005), Aruoba
et al. (2011) and Waller (2011). We also compare the growth and welfare e¤ects of ination
from the search model to those from a standard CIA endogenous-growth model and nd the
following important di¤erences between these two approaches.
Qualitatively, while the growth e¤ect of ination operates solely through endogenous la-
bor supply in the CIA model, the growth e¤ect of ination operates through an additional
consumption e¤ect in the decentralized market in the search model. Intuitively, a higher
ination increases the cost of holding money and reduces consumption in the decentralized
market that requires the use of money for transactions. As a result of lower consumption in
the decentralized market, capital demand decreases causing a reduction in capital accumula-
tion and economic growth regardless of whether or not labor supply is endogenous. However,
when labor supply is exogenous in the CIA model, ination has no e¤ect on economic growth.
Quantitatively, we evaluate the welfare cost of ination and nd that the search model
exhibits a larger welfare gain than the CIA model when we decrease the ination rate from
its empirical level in the US towards the Friedman rule. This nding is consistent with
previous studies, such as Lagos and Wright (2005) and Aruoba et al. (2011); however, we
also discover a novel nding that the search model exhibits a smaller welfare gain than
the CIA model when we decrease the ination rate to zero. These contrasting results arise
because social welfare is a non-linear function of money growth in the search model. Due to
this non-linearity, when the change in ination is small (large), the search model exhibits a
smaller (larger) welfare e¤ect than the CIA model. Therefore, it is not always the case that
the search model exhibits a larger welfare e¤ect of ination than the CIA model, as often
claimed in the literature.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the two-sector search
model. In Section 3, we analyze the growth and welfare e¤ects of ination in the search
model. In Section 4, we present a canonical CIA model and analyze the growth and welfare
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e¤ects of ination. In Section 5, we calibrate the two models to provide a quantitative
comparison of the two approaches. The nal section concludes.
2 A search-based monetary growth model
The two-sector search model is due to Lagos and Wright (2005). Aruoba et al. (2011)
extend the Lagos-Wright model by introducing capital accumulation, whereas Waller (2011)
further extends the model in Aruoba et al. (2011) by allowing for exogenous technological
progress. Our model is based on Waller (2011), but we introduce capital externality into his
model to generate endogenous growth. In what follows, we describe the basic features of the
search-based monetary growth model.
2.1 Households
There is a unit measure of identical and innitely-lived households in discrete time. In each
period, households engage in economic activities rst in the decentralized market (hereafter
DM) and then in the centralized market (hereafter CM). The DM and the CM are dis-
tinguished as follows. In period t, households rst enter the DM where they consume or
produce special goods qt. In this market, each meeting is random and anonymous so that
money becomes essential.1 Once the round of DM trade is completed, households proceed
to the CM where they consume and produce general goods as in standard growth models.
Following the common approach in the literature, we assume that there is no discounting
between the DM and the CM within each period, and the discount factor between any two
consecutive periods is  2 (0; 1). In what follows, we rst discuss householdsoptimization
in the CM.
2.1.1 Householdsoptimization in the CM
In the CM, households have an instantaneous utility function ut = lnxt   Aht, which is
increasing in the consumption of general goods xt and decreasing in the supply of labor ht.
The parameter A > 0 determines the disutility of labor supply. Let W (mt; kt) and V (mt; kt)
denote the period-t value functions for households in the CM and the DM respectively. mt
is the nominal money balance and kt is the capital stock owned by households in period t.
The maximization problem of households in the CM can be expressed as
W (mt; kt) = max
xt;ht;mt+1;kt+1
[lnxt   Aht + V (mt+1; kt+1)] (1)
1Following the standard approach in the literature, we assume that capital cannot serve as a medium of
exchange; see Williamson and Wright (2010) and Aruoba et al. (2011) for a useful discussion. Lagos and
Rocheteau (2008) show that even when capital serves as a competing medium of exchange, at money can
still be valued and used as a medium of exchange.
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subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by
kt+1 +
mt+1
pt
= wtht + (1 + rt   )kt + mt
pt
+  t   xt. (2)
pt is the price of general goods. wt is the real wage rate (denominated in the price of general
goods). rt is the rental price of capital. The parameter   0 is the depreciation rate of
capital.  t is a real lump-sum transfer from the government.
From standard optimization, the optimality condition for consumption in the CM is
1
xt
=
A
wt
. (3)
Equation (3) implies that all households consume the same amount of general goods xt in
the CM regardless of their holdings of capital and money. This useful property results from
the quasi-linear utility function, which is a standard simplifying assumption in this branch
of model to eliminate any dispersion in money holdings that arises from trades in the DM.2
The standard intertemporal optimality conditions for the accumulation of capital and money
are respectively
1
xt
= Vk(mt+1; kt+1), (4)
1
ptxt
= Vm(mt+1; kt+1). (5)
Equations (3) to (5) imply that all households enter the DM in the next period with the
same holdings of capital and money. In addition, the familiar envelope conditions are
Wk(mt; kt) =
1 + rt   
xt
, (6)
Wm(mt; kt) =
1
ptxt
. (7)
2.1.2 Householdsoptimization in the DM
In the DM, a household either becomes (a) a buyer, (b) a seller or (c) a nontrader. The
probability of becoming a buyer is  2 (0; 0:5), and the probability of becoming a seller
is also  2 (0; 0:5). The probability of becoming a nontrader is 1   2 > 0. As  ! 0,
monetary policy would have no e¤ects on economic growth and social welfare. This taste-and-
technology-shock specication shows a matching technology that buyers meet with sellers
and is a standard feature of the Lagos-Wright model. As a result of this taste-and-technology
shock, the value of entering the DM is
V (mt; kt) = V
b(mt; kt) + V
s(mt; kt) + (1  2)W (mt; kt), (8)
where V b(:) and V s(:) are the values of being a buyer and a seller respectively.
2See for example, Rocheteau and Wright (2005) and Aruoba et al. (2011) for a useful discussion.
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To analyze V b(:) and V s(:), we consider the following functional forms for the buyers
preference and the sellersproduction technology. In the DM, each buyers utility ln qbt is
increasing and concave in the consumption of special goods. Each seller produces special
goods qst by combining her capital kt and e¤ort et subject to the following Cobb-Douglas
production function.
qst = z
1 
t k

t e

t , (9)
where zt denotes aggregate technology. To achieve endogenous growth, we will follow Romer
(1986) to assume that capital has a positive externality e¤ect on aggregate technology such
that zt = kt, where kt is the aggregate holding of capital in the economy.3 The parameter
 2 (0; 1) determines capital share. To ensure constant returns to scale, we will impose
 = 1  for labor share; however, it would be useful for us to rst present the analysis with
 in order to isolate the e¤ects of capital and labor shares.
Rewriting equation (9), we can express the utility cost of production as
e

qst
zt
;
kt
zt

=

qst
zt
1= 
kt
zt
 =
. (10)
Buyers purchase special goods qbt by spending money d
b
t , whereas sellers earn money d
s
t by
producing special goods qst .
4 Given these terms of trade, the values of being a buyer and a
seller are respectively5
V b(mt; kt) = ln q
b
t +W (mt   dbt ; kt), (11)
V s(mt; kt) =  e

qst
zt
;
kt
zt

+W (mt + d
s
t ; kt). (12)
Di¤erentiating (11) and (12) and substituting them into (8), we can obtain the following
envelope condition for mt.
Vm(mt; kt) = (1  2)Wm(mt; kt) + 

1
qbt
@qbt
@mt
+Wm(mt   dbt ; kt)

1  @d
b
t
@mt

(13)
+

 e1

qst
zt
;
kt
zt

1
zt
@qst
@mt
+Wm(mt + d
s
t ; kt)

1 +
@dst
@mt

,
where Wm(mt; kt) = Wm(mt   dbt ; kt) = Wm(mt + dst ; kt) = 1=(ptxt) from (7). Similarly, we
can obtain the following envelope condition for kt.
Vk(mt; kt) = (1  2)Wk(mt; kt) + 

1
qbt
@qbt
@kt
 Wm(mt   dbt ; kt)
@dbt
@kt
+Wk(mt   dbt ; kt)

(14)
+

 e1

qst
zt
;
kt
zt

1
zt
@qst
@kt
  e2

qst
zt
;
kt
zt

1
zt
+Wm(mt + d
s
t ; kt)
@dst
@kt
+Wk(mt + d
s
t ; kt)

,
3It is useful to note that kt = kt in equilibrium.
4As a result of these di¤erent money holdings at the end of the DM, households supply di¤erent amounts
of labor in the CM that eliminate any dispersion in money holdings.
5Adding a disutility parameter to the supply of e¤ort in the DM would not change our qualitative and
quantitative results. Therefore, we follow Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011) to normalize this parameter
to unity.
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where Wk(mt; kt) = Wk(mt   dbt ; kt) = Wk(mt + dst ; kt) = (1 + rt   )=xt from (6).
To solve the marginal value of holding money (13) and capital (14), we consider a com-
petitive equilibrium with price taking as in Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011).6 Under
price taking, once buyers and sellers are matched, they both act as price takers. Given the
price ept of special goods, buyers choose qbt to maximize
V b(mt; kt) = max
qbt
[ln qbt +W (mt   eptqbt ; kt)] (15)
subject to the budget constraint
dbt = eptqbt  mt. (16)
In the DM, buyers spend all their money,7 so that the money constraint implies that
qbt = mt=ept. (17)
As for sellersmaximization problem in the DM, it is given by
V s(mt; kt) = max
qst

 e

qst
zt
;
kt
zt

+W (mt + eptqst ; kt) . (18)
Sellersoptimal supplies of special goods can be obtained from the following condition.
e1

qst
zt
;
kt
zt

1
zt
= eptWm(mt + eptqst ; kt), 1e

qst
zt
;
kt
zt

=
eptqst
ptxt
, (19)
where the second equality of (19) makes use of (7) and (10).
Using (17) and (19), we can obtain @qbt=@mt = 1=ept, @dbt=@mt = 1, and @dst=@kt =ept (@qst =@kt), whereas the other partial derivatives, @qbt=@kt, @dbt=@kt, @qst =@mt and @dst=@mt,
in (13) and (14) are zero. Substituting these conditions, qbt = q
s
t = qt and (19) into (13) and
(14), we can derive the following conditions.
Vm(mt; kt) =
1  
ptxt
+
eptqt , (20)
Vk(mt; kt) =
1 + rt   
xt
  
zt
e2

qt
zt
;
kt
zt

. (21)
6In addition to the competitive equilibrium with price taking, Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011)
also consider bargaining between buyers and sellers to determine the terms of trade, which is also a common
approach in the literature. In the present study, we only consider the competitive equilibrium with price
taking because of economic growth. In the case of generalized Nash bargaining as in Aruoba et al. (2011)
or proportional bargaining as in Waller (2011), the bargaining condition is incompatible with balanced
growth because the buyersutility, which determines their surplus, is increasing overtime due to economic
growth whereas the sellersdisutility of e¤ort is stationary on a balanced growth path. In Appendix A, we
demonstrate this problem under proportional bargaining and show that only a special case in which buyers
gain all surplus is consistent with balanced growth. The same result can also be shown for the case of
generalized Nash bargaining.
7See Appendix B for a proof. Intuitively, due to the opportunity cost of holding money and the possibility
of not being a buyer in the DM, households do not carry a su¢ cient amount of money to the DM. Therefore,
if a household turns out to be a buyer in the DM, it would be optimal to spend all the money on qbt .
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Intuitively, (20) states that the marginal benet of holding money is the sum of the marginal
utility from being able to consume special goods with probability  (i.e., the household
becomes a buyer in the DM) and the marginal utility from spending the money, which is
also a valuable asset in the CM, on general goods with probability 1   (i.e., the household
does not become a buyer in the DM). Equation (21) states that the marginal benet of
holding capital is the sum of the marginal utility from spending the capital return 1 + rt  
on general goods in the CM and the expected marginal utility from having to exert less
e¤ort (recall that e2 < 0) in producing special goods in the DM with probability  (i.e., the
household becomes a seller in the DM).8
2.2 Firms in the CM
General goods are produced by using capital kt and production labor ht with the following
Cobb-Douglas production function.
yx;t = z
1 
t k

t h

t , (22)
where aggregate technology is zt = kt as before. The producers act competitively by tak-
ing output and input prices as given. The conditional demand functions for capital and
production labor are respectively
rt = z
1 
t k
 1
t h

t , (23)
wt = z
1 
t k

t h
 1
t . (24)
2.3 Monetary authority
Let t = (mt+1  mt)=mt denote the growth rate of money supply that is exogenously set
by the monetary authority. Given the denition of real money balance mt=pt (denominated
in the price of general goods), its evolution can then be expressed as
mt+1
pt+1
=

1 + t
1 + t

mt
pt
, (25)
where t is the ination rate that is endogenous and determines the cost of holding money.
In each period, the monetary authority issues money to nance a lump-sum transfer that
has a real value of  t = (mt+1  mt)=pt = tmt=pt.
8Following Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011), we assume that the stock of capital does not depreciate
within a period even upon usage in the DM. Capital depreciation only occurs at the end of a period after
usage in the CM.
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2.4 Competitive equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is a sequence of allocations fht; xt; yx;t; qt; dt;mt+1; kt+1g1t=0, a
sequence of prices fwt; rt; pt; ept; tg1t=0 and a sequence of policies ft;  tg1t=0. Also, in each
period, the following conditions hold.
 In the CM, households choose fht; xt;mt+1; kt+1g to maximize (1) subject to (2) taking
fwt; rt; pt;  tg as given;
 In the DM, buyers and sellers choose fqt; dtg to maximize their value functions taking
feptg as given;
 Competitive rms in the CM produce fyx;tg to maximize prot taking fwt; rtg as given;
 The real value of aggregate consumption includes consumption in the CM and the DM
such that ct  (ptxt + eptqt)=pt;
 The real value of aggregate output includes output in the CM and the DM such that
yt  (ptyx;t + eptqt)=pt;
 The capital stock accumulates through investment from general goods such that kt+1 =
yx;t   xt + (1  )kt;
 The monetary authority balances its budget such that  t = tmt=pt.
2.5 Balanced growth path
In this subsection, we consider the dynamic properties of the model. Given that the monetary
authority sets a stationary growth rate of money supply (i.e., t =  for all t), Proposition
1 shows that the economy jumps to a unique and locally stable balanced growth path. The
proof is relegated to Appendix C. Given this balanced growth behavior of the model, we
analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on the balanced growth path in the next section.
Proposition 1 Given a stationary sequence of monetary policy (i.e., t =  for all t), the
economy jumps to a unique and stable balanced growth path.
3 Growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on the balanced growth path along
which the supply of labor is stationary. Given the equilibrium condition kt = kt, variables,
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such as output, consumption, capital and real money balance, exhibit a common growth rate
g. Using (4), (10) and (21), we obtain
g  xt+1
xt
  1 = 
 
1 + r    + fcf
1=
d

!
  1, (26)
where r = h from (23). The variables fc  x=k and fd  q=k denote the steady-state
consumption-capital ratios in the CM and the DM respectively.
We rst make use of (5), (10), (19), (20) and (25) to derive the steady-state consumption-
capital ratio in the DM. We obtain
fd =


(1 + )=   (1  )

. (27)
fd must be positive because  >    1 > (1   )   1.9 Equation (27) shows that the
consumption-capital ratio in the DM is decreasing in the growth rate of money supply, and
this result can be shown as follows.
@fd
@
=  

()
[(1 + )=   (1  )]1+ < 0. (28)
Intuitively, a higher money growth rate increases ination, which in turn increases the cost
of consumption in the DM, where money is needed for transactions.
As for fc, we make use of (23), (24), (26) and the capital-accumulation equation kt+1 =
yx;t   xt + (1  )kt to derive
fc =
(1  )h + (1  )(1  )
1 + f
1=
d =
, (29)
where aggregate labor h is still an endogenous variable and can be determined with the
following condition.
Ah1 fc = , (30)
which uses (3) and (24). We use (30) to derive
@fc
@
=  (1  )
Ah2 
@h
@
. (31)
As for the derivative of h, we substitute (27) and (30) into (29) and then take the di¤erentials
of h with respect to  to obtain
dh
d
=   (f
1=
d =)
2
A(1  ) + (1  )

1 + f
1=
d =

=h
< 0. (32)
9It can be shown that as !    1, the nominal interest rate approaches the lower bound of zero. Here
the nominal interest rate refers to the nominal rate of return on a conventional interest-bearing bond that
pays interests in the CM (but not in the DM) of each period.
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Substituting (32) into (31) shows that @fc=@ > 0. In summary, a higher money growth
rate induces households to increase leisure and shift consumption from the DM to the CM.
Substituting (29) into (26), we obtain
g = h +
(1  )h + (1  )(1  )
1 + 1=(f
1=
d =)
+ (1  )  1. (33)
From (33), it is easy to see that the growth rate g is decreasing in  because @h=@ < 0
and @fd=@ < 0. It is useful to note that there are two channels through which  causes
a negative e¤ect on economic growth. The rst channel is endogenous labor supply, which
is standard in monetary growth models. Intuitively, a decrease in labor supply reduces the
marginal product of capital thereby reducing capital accumulation.
The second channel is through the consumption-capital ratio fd in the DM. The intu-
ition for the presence of this second channel can be explained as follows. A higher ination
increases the cost of holding money, thereby reducing the real money balance held by house-
holds and the value of goods traded in the DM. As a result, capital demand is depressed
reducing the growth rate. To separate the consumption and labor-supply e¤ects, we briey
consider the limiting case  ! 0.
lim
!0
g =  +
1   + (1  )(1  )
1 + [(1 + )=   (1  )]=(2) + (1  )  1, (34)
where we have used f 1=d = = =[(1 + )=   (1   )] from (27). Therefore, even when the
search-based monetary growth model approaches the case without endogenous labor supply,
ination continues to have a detrimental e¤ect on economic growth. This result stands in
stark contrast to the CIA growth model as we will show in the next section.
Proposition 2 A higher money growth rate  reduces economic growth through two chan-
nels: (a) endogenous labor supply h, and (b) the consumption-capital ratio fd in the DM.
Next, we examine the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy. In this two-sector search model,
households engage in two types of economic activities in the DM and the CM every period.
On the balanced growth path, the lifetime utility U of households that includes the utility
from the CM and the expected utility from the DM can be expressed as
(1  )U =  ln q0   

q0
k0
1=
| {z }
DM
+ lnx0   Ah| {z }
CM
+
(1 + )
1   ln(1 + g)| {z }
growth
. (35)
Substituting q0 = fdk0 and x0 = fck0 into (35) and then normalizing initial k0 to unity, (35)
simplies to
(1  )U =  ln fd   f 1=d + ln fc   Ah+
(1 + )
1   ln(1 + g). (36)
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Di¤erentiating (36) with respect to  yields
(1  )@U
@
=

fd
 
1  f
1=
d

!
@fd
@
 
+
1
fc
@fc
@
+
  A@h
@
 
+
(1 + )
(1  )(1 + g)
@g
@
 
, (37)
where f 1=d = < 1 from (27) because  >    1. A higher money growth rate (a) decreases
the consumption-capital ratio fd in the DM, (b) increases the consumption-capital ratio fc
in the CM, (c) decreases labor supply h in the CM, and (d) decreases economic growth g.
E¤ects (a) and (d) hurt welfare, whereas e¤ects (b) and (c) improve welfare. Although it
appears that the overall e¤ect of money growth on welfare is ambiguous, we show below that
higher money growth is in fact detrimental to social welfare.
Comparing the equilibrium allocations and the rst-best allocations, we nd that (a)
fd < f

d , (b) fc > f

c , (c) h < h
, and (d) g < g, where the variables with superscript *
denote rst-best allocations.10 In other words, there is too little consumption in the DM due
to the cost of holding money. In the CM, there is too much consumption and too little labor
supply due to capital externality. Finally, the equilibrium growth rate is also suboptimally
low. Therefore, increasing the money growth rate that forces the equilibrium allocations to
deviate further from the rst-best allocations is detrimental to welfare. On the other hand,
decreasing the money growth improves welfare, and the Friedman rule (given by !   1)
is optimal in this model. However, although the Friedman rule is optimal, it does not achieve
the rst-best allocations due to the presence of capital externality.11
Proposition 3 A higher money growth rate  reduces social welfare, and the Friedman rule
is optimal but does not achieve the rst-best allocations due to capital externality.
4 A cash-in-advance model
In this section, we develop a monetary growth model with a CIA constraint to compare the
e¤ects of monetary policy in this model with the e¤ects in the search model. We make two
changes to the search model. First, we eliminate the DM so that ct = xt in the CM is the
only consumption goods now. Second, we introduce the following cash-in-advance constraint
on consumption.
ct  mt
pt
, (38)
where  2 (0; 1]. Equation (38) implies that households hold the real money balance to
facilitate the purchase of consumption goods ct. Following Dotsey and Ireland (1996), we
assume that only a fraction of consumption expenditures is subject the CIA constraint, and
10In Appendix D, we derive the rst-best allocations of the search model and prove these inequalities.
11It is useful to note that the Friedman rule is not always optimal under price taking in the search model.
For example, Rocheteau and Wright (2005) show that the Friedman rule is not optimal when there exist
search externalities.
11
this specication allows us to perform a more realistic quantitative analysis on the welfare
cost of ination. As  ! 0, monetary policy would have no e¤ects on growth and welfare.
On the balanced growth path, the growth rate of consumption is given by
g =  (1 + r   )  1 =  (1 + h   )  1. (39)
In contrast to the search model, (39) shows an important implication that monetary policy
a¤ects economic growth solely through endogenous labor supply h in the CIA model. In
other words,
@g
@
=

h1 
@h
@
. (40)
In the case of exogenous labor supply (i.e., h is constant), @g=@ = 0. We relegate the
derivation of h to Appendix E. In summary, the equilibrium h is implicitly determined by
the following condition.

(1  )h+ (1  )(1  )h1  =
A

[(1 + ) + (1  )] , (41)
which shows that h is decreasing in . Taking the total di¤erentials of h with respect to 
in (41) and then substituting dh=d into (40) yield
@g
@
=   A[(1  )h+ (1  )(1  )h
1 ]2
h1  [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )(1  )=h] < 0. (42)
Intuitively, a monetary expansion induces households to reduce their money holdings and
consumption via the CIA constraint. As a result, households consume more leisure instead.
The reduction in labor supply decreases the marginal product of capital, thereby reducing
economic growth.
As for social welfare, we can derive householdslifetime utility U as follows.
(1  )U = ln c0   Ah+ 
1   ln(1 + g) = ln f   Ah+

1   ln(1 + g). (43)
where f  c0=k0 and initial k0 is normalized to unity. Furthermore, from the capital-
accumulation equation, one can show that
f = h   g    = (1  )h + (1  )(1  ), (44)
where the second equality uses (39). Equation (44) implies that @f=@ and @h=@ have the
same sign. Finally, di¤erentiating (43) with respect to  yields
(1  )@U
@
=
1
f
@f
@
 
  A@h
@
 
+

(1  )(1 + g)
@g
@
 
. (45)
Although @U=@ appears to be ambiguous in (45), the Friedman rule also holds in the CIA
model.12 Intuitively, labor supply h in the equilibrium is suboptimally low, so that any
increase in  that further reduces h is harmful to social welfare. On the other hand, decreas-
ing the money growth rate improves welfare, and the Friedman rule is optimal. However, as
in the search model, although the Friedman rule is optimal in the CIA model, it does not
achieve the rst-best allocations due to the presence of capital externality.
12See Appendix E for derivations.
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5 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the two models in order to perform a numerical investigation to
evaluate the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare. We consider
two policy objectives (a) price stability (or equivalently, zero ination) and (b) the Friedman
rule. Both of these policy objectives are commonly analyzed in the literature; see for example,
Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Lucas (2000), Lagos and Wright (2005) and Aruoba et al. (2011).
To calibrate the structural parameters, we will match the modelsimplied moments to
data in the US. One empirical moment that we consider is the ratio of money holding to
consumption expenditures. The larger this ratio is, the larger the welfare e¤ects of monetary
policy would be. To ensure robustness, we consider two monetary aggregates, currency and
M1, as alternative measures of money held by households for the purpose of facilitating
transactions. On the one hand, currency holding by households is a subset of the money
holding that is subject to the cost of ination. On the other hand, M1 includes interest-
bearing assets, such as demand deposits, which are partly immune to the depreciation e¤ect
of ination. Therefore, we consider the welfare cost of ination computed based on currency
as a lower bound and the welfare cost computed based on M1 as an upper bound.
5.1 Calibration
We begin by characterizing a benchmark economy, in which each structural parameter is
either set to a conventional value or matched to an empirical moment in the US. The discount
factor  is set to 0.952 to match an annual discount rate of 5%. The capital-share parameter
 is set to 0.3, which implies a labor share  = 1    of 0.7. We consider an initial money
growth rate of 5.8%, so that the annual ination rate is 3% (i.e., the average ination rate
in the US from 1990 to 2008) when the economy grows at an annual growth rate of 2.7%
(i.e., the average output growth rate in the US from 1990 to 2008). We choose a value
for the depreciation rate  to match the investment-capital ratio of 0.07 (i.e., the average
investment-capital ratio in the US from 1990 to 2008), and this value of  is 0.043.
When we match the average ratio of currency to householdsconsumption expenditures
in the US, we set the probability  to 0.009 in the search model and the cash-in-advance
parameter  to 0.075 in the CIA model. In this case, the money-consumption ratio is 0.075.
When we match the ratio of M1 to householdsconsumption expenditures, we set  to 0.025
and  to 0.185. In this case, the money-consumption ratio is 0.185. Finally, when money is
measured by currency, we set the leisure parameter A to 3.087, so that the long-run growth
rate in the search model is 2.7%. As for the CIA model, we set A to 3.059, so that the
long-run growth rate in the CIA model is also 2.7%. When money is measure by M1, we
set A to 3.104 in the search model and 3.022 in the CIA model respectively to match the
long-run growth rate of 2.7%. We summarize these parameter values in Table 1a. As for the
equilibrium values of the key variables, we report them in Table 1b. The total consumption-
capital ratio of 0.335 and the capital-output ratio of 2.472 from the model are in line with
empirical moments (c=k = 0:308 and k=y = 2:223) in the US.
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Table 1a: Benchmark parameter values
Parameter        A
Currency specification
The search model 0.300 0.700 0.952 0.058 0.009 - 0.043 3.087
The CIA model 0.300 0.700 0.952 0.058 - 0.075 0.043 3.059
M1 specification
The search model 0.300 0.700 0.952 0.058 0.025 - 0.043 3.104
The CIA model 0.300 0.700 0.952 0.058 - 0.185 0.043 3.022
Table 1b: Benchmark equilibrium values
Variable g  h fd fc c=k i=k k=y
Currency specification
The search model 0.027 0.030 0.274 0.127 0.334 0.335 0.070 2.472
The CIA model 0.027 0.030 0.274 - - 0.335 0.070 2.472
M1 specification
The search model 0.027 0.030 0.273 0.240 0.333 0.335 0.070 2.472
The CIA model 0.027 0.030 0.274 - - 0.335 0.070 2.472
5.2 Numerical results
Given the above set of parameter values, we consider the following policy experiments. First,
we lower  from 0.058 to a value that achieves zero ination, and this value is 0.027. In this
case, the ination rate decreases from 3% to 0% in both models under both money speci-
cations. As for the Friedman rule, we lower  from 0.058 to -0.048, so the nominal interest
rate decreases and approaches zero. In Table 2, we report the results, which are expressed
in percent changes, except for g and U . The changes in g are expressed in percentage point,
and the changes in U are expressed in the usual equivalent variations in annual consumption.
Table 2: Growth and welfare e¤ects of a lower 
 (fd) %  (fc) %  (c=k) %  (h) %  (g) %  (U) %
Zero ination
Currency specification
The search model 24.649  0.002 0.023 0.008 0.003 0.229
The CIA model - - 0.160 0.265 0.021 0.355
M1 specification
The search model 20.789  0.014 0.131 0.046 0.018 0.659
The CIA model - - 0.387 0.641 0.052 0.867
The Friedman rule
Currency specification
The search model 512.706  0.079 0.751 0.262 0.100 2.732
The CIA model - - 0.554 0.918 0.074 1.233
M1 specification
The search model 224.754  0.194 1.850 0.649 0.248 5.747
The CIA model - - 1.365 2.265 0.183 3.076
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In Table 2, we see that reducing the money growth rate has the following e¤ects. First, it
raises the supply of labor in both models; however, this labor-supply e¤ect is much larger in
the CIA model than in the search model. This expansion in labor supply serves to increase
economic growth in both models. Second, it raises the consumption-capital ratio fd in the
DM, and this increase in fd also serves to increase economic growth in the search model.
Comparing  (fd) % under zero ination and the Friedman rule, we see that the increase in
fd is disproportionately larger under the Friedman rule than under zero ination. From (27),
we see that fd is a decreasing and convex function in , and this property has the following
implications on the growth and welfare e¤ects of ination.
We nd that the equilibrium growth rate g increases in both models under both money
specications. However, it is interesting to note that although the search model exhibits
a larger growth e¤ect than the CIA model in the case of the Friedman rule, the search
model exhibits a smaller growth e¤ect than the CIA model in the case of zero ination.
For example, under the M1 specication, the positive growth e¤ect from decreasing ination
from 3% to the Friedman rule in the search model is 0.25% compared to 0.18% in the CIA
model. However, also under the M1 specication, the growth e¤ect from decreasing ination
from 3% to zero ination in the search model is 0.018% compared to 0.052% in the CIA
model. These contrasting results are also robust to the currency specication.
Examining the e¤ects on social welfare, we also see a similar pattern. In other words,
the search model exhibits a larger (smaller) welfare e¤ect than the CIA model in the case of
the Friedman rule (zero ination). For example, under the M1 specication, the welfare gain
from decreasing ination from 3% to the Friedman rule in the search model is 5.7% compared
to 3.1% in the CIA model. However, also under the M1 specication, the welfare gain from
decreasing ination from 3% to zero ination in the search model is 0.66% compared to 0.87%
in the CIA model. These contrasting results are also robust to the currency specication. In
Figures 1 and 2, we plot welfare changes against the money growth rate under the M1 and
currency specications respectively and nd that the welfare e¤ect of money growth in the
CIA model is approximately linear whereas the welfare e¤ect of money growth in the search
model is convex. As a result, the welfare e¤ect in the search model dominates (is dominated
by) the CIA model under large (small) changes in .
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here]
We have conducted a number of robustness checks for the above results. We nd that the
only cases in which the welfare e¤ect in one model always dominates the e¤ect in the other
model are the followings. When we decrease the value of  in the AK model while holding
all other parameters constant, the welfare e¤ect of ination in the CIA model decreases and
eventually becomes always dominated by the search model. Similarly, when we decrease
the value of  in the search model while holding all other parameters constant, the welfare
e¤ect of ination in the search model decreases and eventually becomes always dominated
by the CIA model. Also, when we increase the value of A in the search model while keeping
the value of A in the CIA model constant, the welfare e¤ect of money growth in the search
model decreases and eventually becomes always dominated by the e¤ect in the CIA model.13
13It is useful to note that due to the di¤erent values of A and the resulting di¤erent growth rates of output,
the rate of ination that corresponds to each money growth rate would be di¤erent across the two models.
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Similarly, when we increase the value of A in the CIA model, the welfare e¤ect of money
growth in the CIA model decreases and eventually becomes always dominated by the search
model. However, all these changes would give rise to di¤erent calibrated values for the
implied moments, such as the money-consumption ratio and the growth rate of output, from
the two models making them improper comparisons.
Therefore, we conclude that when the two models are calibrated to match the same set
of empirical moments, the welfare gain from decreasing ination would be larger (smaller)
in a canonical search-based monetary growth model with price taking than in a canonical
CIA growth model if the change in the growth rate of money supply is large (small). It is
possible that this result may change when additional features, such as bargaining and search
externalities, are added to the search model, but then the di¤erent result would be driven
by an interaction between search and these additional features rather than driven by search
per se.14
6 Conclusion
In this note, we have compared the growth and welfare e¤ects of ination between a search-
based monetary growth model and a canonical CIA growth model. We nd that the qual-
itative e¤ects of ination on economic growth and social welfare are similar across the two
models. In other words, a monetary expansion is detrimental to economic growth and social
welfare in both models. Nevertheless, we nd some important di¤erences between the two
approaches. First, the growth e¤ect of ination in the search model operates through both
endogenous labor supply and the consumption-capital ratio in the DM as compared to only
the labor-supply channel in the CIA model. Second, the two approaches provide di¤erent
quantitative implications. Specically, it is not always the case that the search model exhibits
a larger welfare e¤ect of ination than the CIA model, as often claimed in the literature.
Given these interesting di¤erences and the relative tractability of recent vintages of search
models, it would be a fruitful direction for future research to further revisit the interesting
implications of monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare using variants of the
search-based monetary growth model.
14See Craig and Rocheteau (2008) for an interesting analysis on the welfare cost of ination in a search
model under di¤erent pricing mechanims with search externalities.
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Appendix A: Bargaining in the search model
In this appendix, we show that proportional bargaining is incompatible with balanced
growth unless we focus on a special case in which buyers obtain all surplus.15 If a buyer with
state
 
mbt ; k
b
t

is matched with a seller with state (mst ; k
s
t ), then a proportional bargaining
problem, in which the buyers gains from trade are a xed share  of the trade surplus can
be expressed as
Max
qt
ln qt +W (m
b
t   dt; kbt )| {z }
buyers payo¤
  W (mbt ; kbt )| {z }
buyers threat point
= 

ln qt   e

qt
zt
;
kst
zt

| {z }
trade surplus
; (A1)
subject to the budget constraint dt  mbt . Using (7) and substituting dt = mbt into (A1), the
bargaining condition for special goods is
(1  ) ln qt = Am
b
t
ptwt
  e

qt
zt
;
kst
zt

: (A2)
In (A2), qt is increasing overtime due to economic growth whereas mbt= (ptwt), qt=zt and
kst =zt are stationary on a balanced growth path. As a result, the bargaining condition is
incompatible with balanced growth unless the buyer obtains all surplus (i.e.,  = 1).
Appendix B: Consumption in the DM
In this appendix, we show that it is optimal for the buyers to spend all their money to
consume special goods in the DM. Di¤erentiating (15) with respect to qbt yields
@V b(mt; kt)
@qbt
=
1
qbt
  eptWm(mt   eptqbt ; kt) = 1qbt   eptptxt , (B1)
where the second equality follows from (7). The second-order condition shows that V b(:) is
globally concave in qbt and reaches a maximum at q
b
t = ptxt=ept. In what follows, we show
that qbt = mt=ept < ptxt=ept implying that the money constraint must be binding because
qbt < ptxt=ept , @V b(:)=@qbt > 0. Setting qbt = qst = qt and zt = kt = kt in (10) and (19), we
have eptqt
ptxt
=
1


qt
zt
1=
, (B2)
where qt=zt = fd. From (27), we know that f
1=
d = < 1 because  >    1. Therefore,eptqt = mt < ptxt.
15The same result can be shown for the case of generalized Nash bargaining.
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Appendix C: Dynamic properties of the search model
In this appendix, we show that the economy in the search model always jumps to a unique
and locally stable balanced growth path given a stationary sequence of monetary policy (i.e.,
t =  for all t). Combining (17) and (19) and using (10), we can obtain
mt
ptxt
=
1


qt
kt
1=
. (C1)
Here we dene fd;t  qt=kt as the ratio between consumption and capital in the DM and
make use of (5), (17), (20), (25) and (C1) to derive
(1 + )

fd;t
fd;t+1
1=
= 
"
1 +  +

f
1=
d;t+1
#
. (C2)
Combining (3), (5), (21), (23) and (24) and using (10) to yield
kt+1
kt

ht+1
ht
 1
= 
h
1 + ht+1    +

A

h 1t+1 f
1=
d;t+1
i
. (C3)
In addition, the capital-accumulation equation is kt+1=kt = yx;t=kt   xt=kt + 1    = ht  
h 1t =A+ 1  . Applying this equation to (C3) yields

ht  
h 1t
A
+ 1  

ht+1
ht
 1
= 
h
1 + ht+1    +

A

h 1t+1 f
1=
d;t+1
i
. (C4)
Log-linearizing (C2) and (C4) around the steady-state equilibrium yields the following
deterministic system:
log (ht+1=h)
log (fd;t+1=fd)

=

a11 a12
a21 a22

| {z }
Jacobian matrix

log (ht=h)
log (fd;t=fd)

, (C5)
where
a11 =
h+  (1  )

1   + h + h 1f 1=d =A

+  (1  )h 1=A
()h+  (1  ) (1   + h) > 1,
a12 =   ()h
 1f 1=d =A
()h+  (1  ) (1   + h)


   () (1 + ) [(1 + )=   (1  ))]

< 0,
a21 = 0,
a22 =

   () (1 + ) [(1 + )=   (1  ))] > 1.
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Let s1 and s2 be the two characteristic roots of the dynamic system. The trace and deter-
minant of Jacobian are given by
Tr = s1 + s2 = a11 + a22 > 0, (C6)
Det = s1s2 = a11a22 > 0. (C7)
As indicated in (C6) and (C7), the dynamic system exists two unstable characteristic roots
(s1 = a11 > 1 and s2 = a22 > 1). Given h and fd are jump variables, two unstable
characteristic roots imply that the economy jumps to a unique and locally stable balanced
growth path.
Appendix D: First-best allocations of the search model
In this appendix, we derive the rst-best allocations of the search model and compare
them with the equilibrium allocations. The planner chooses all quantities directly, taking all
relevant information into account. Here money is not essential. The planners problem is
J(kt) = max
qt;xt;ht;kt+1
(
 ln qt   

qt
kt
1=
+ lnxt   Aht + J(kt+1)
)
, (D1)
subject to the capital-accumulation equation
kt+1 = kth

t   xt + (1  )kt. (D2)
From standard dynamic optimization, the optimality conditions for qt and ht are respectively
qt
kt
= , (D3)
Ah1 t

xt
kt

= . (D4)
The intertemporal optimality condition for capital accumulation is
1
xt
= Jk(kt+1), (D5)
and the envelope condition is
Jk(kt) =

kt

qt
kt
1=
+
1
xt
(1   + ht ). (D6)
Combining (D5) and (D6), we can derive the rst-best balanced growth rate g given by
g  xt+1
xt
  1 = 
"
1 + (h)    + f

c (f

d )
1=

#
  1, (D7)
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where f c  (x=k) and f d  (q=k) denote the rst-best consumption-capital ratios for
general goods and special goods respectively. From (D3), we can obtain
(f d )
1=

= 1. (D8)
As for f c , combining (D7) and (D2) yields
f c =
(1  ) (h) + (1  )(1  )
1 +  (f d )
1= =
. (D9)
Rewriting (D4) yields
A(h)1 f c = : (D10)
Equations (D7), (D8), (D9) and (D10) determine the rst-best allocations fg; f d ; f c ; hg.
Comparing (D8) and (27) shows that fd < f d because  >    1. Substituting (D10)
into (D9) yields
f c =
(1  )[=(Af c )]=(1 ) + (1  )(1  )
1 +  (f d )
1= =
, (D11)
where (f d )
1= = is determined by (D8). Substituting (30) into (29) yield
fc =
(1  )[=(Afc)]=(1 ) + (1  )(1  )
1 + f
1=
d =
, (D12)
where f 1=d = is determined by (27). Comparing (D11) and (D12) shows that fc > f

c because
fd < f

d and  < 1. Given fc > f

c , (D10) and (30) imply that h < h
. Rewriting (D2) yields
g =
kt+1
kt
  1 = h   fc   . (D13)
Given that h < h and fc > f c , it must be the case that g < g
.
Appendix E: The CIA model
In this appendix, we present the detailed derivations of the CIA model. The household
chooses a sequence of allocations fct, ht, mt+1, kt+1g1t=0 to maximize (1) subject to (2) and
(38), taking as given wt, rt and  t. The optimality condition for labor supply is
1
ct
=
A
wt
+ t; (E1)
where t denotes the Lagrange multiplier for the cash-in-advance constraint in (38). The
standard intertemporal optimality conditions for the accumulation of capital and money are
respectively
A
wt
= Wk(mt+1; kt+1), (E2)
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Aptwt
= Wm(mt+1; kt+1). (E3)
In addition, the familiar envelope conditions are
Wk(mt; kt) =
A(1 + rt   )
wt
; (E4)
Wm(mt; kt) =
A+ twt
ptwt
: (E5)
Based on (E1), (E3) and (E5), we can derive
1
pt+1ct+1
= A


ptwt
+
(1  )
pt+1wt+1

. (E6)
Combining (E2) and (E4), we obtain (1 + rt+1   ) =wt+1 = 1= (wt). Substituting this
condition into (E6), we obtain
1
pt+1ct+1
= A

(1 + rt+1   )
ptwt+1
+
(1  )
pt+1wt+1

. (E7)
On the balanced growth path, variables, kt, yt, ct, wt and mt=pt, grow at the same rate.
Substituting (23), (24) and (25) into (E7), the steady-state equilibrium h is determined by
the following condition.

h1  (c=k)
=
A

[(1 + ) + (1  )] , (E8)
where c=k = h   g    = (1  )h + (1  )(1  ). Therefore, (E8) is identical to (41)
in the main text. The Fisher equation is (1 +R) = (1 + r   )(1 + ), where R denotes the
nominal interest rate. From (25) and (39), we have
R =
1 + 

  1. (E9)
Substituting (E9) into (E8), we can derive

fh1 
= A(1 + R): (E10)
From (40) and (44), equation (45) can be arranged as
(1  )@U
@
=

(1  )
fh1 
+
2
(1  )(1 + g)h1    A

@h
@
. (E11)
Substituting (39) and (E10) into (E11) and using condition f = (1 )h + (1 )(1  ),
we can obtain
(1  )@U
@
=

(1  )AR + A [Rf + (1  )h
]
(1  )(1 + g)

@h
@
< 0. (E12)
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Based on (E9), it is easy to see that
@R
@
=
1

> 0. (E13)
Equation (E12) shows that a rise in  decreases social welfare whereas (E13) shows that
the nominal interest rate rises in . Therefore, social welfare is maximized as the nominal
interest rate approaches zero; in other words, the Friedman rule holds in the CIA model.
Appendix F: Figures
Figure 1: The welfare cost of ination under the M1 specication
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Figure 2: The welfare cost of ination under the currency specication
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